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Chapter 2 
Averroes 
God and the Noble Lie 
RICHARD C. TAYLOR 
While Averroes has certainly been a central figure in Western reflections on the history 
of ideas since the nineteenth century-and before that in the scholastic tradition even 
if only to be often attacked and, as it were, "refuted" by Christian medieval thinkers-
since the mid-nineteenth century he has also been regarded among Arabic writers as 
an important figure confronting the advancement of Western scientific culture with its 
attendant economic benefits, in contrast with the lack of such advancement in the 
Arab world, where religious fundamentalism in various forms has often played a cen-
tral role in society. This latter use of the thought of Averroes by modern Arabic writers 
has been documented by Anke von Kiigelgen in her work on twentieth-century "Arab 
Averroists. "1 Recently this sort of interest has allied itself with somewhat different 
goals of modern Western humanism to set forth the characterization of Averroes as 
an Enlightenment figure, that is, as prefiguring and perhaps contributing to the rise 
of the views central to the Western Enlightenment movement. Both modern Arabic 
writers and Western humanists praise Averroes for his stance on the connection 
between religion and philosophy which they view as "enlightened" and which philo-
sophically might be considered a form of compatibilism.2 
What Averroes is praised for, in this context, is his account of the compatibility of 
Islamic religion and philosophical rationalism as found in his famous Fa~l al-Maqal or 
Decisive Treatise. There he sets out his understanding of human religious psychology in 
a way which allows for the reading of religious texts on multiple levels in accord with 
the capacities of the readers, some being of the rhetorical class who are only able to 
consider scripture literally, others of the dialectical class who are able to approach and 
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understand scripture in the context of preconceived notions or assumptions, and 
finally a last group who are able to consider scripture in accord with truth in its high-
est form, demonstrative argumentation. The Qur'an is taken as being suitable for all 
three classes but with the proviso that those expounding religious doctrine not confuse 
the masses by exposing them to interpretations which they cannot understand and 
which may consequently lead them astray in their religious belief so important to 
proper moral character and a fulfilling and happy human life.3 Although groundwork 
for such a view can be found in the writings of al-Farabi4 and Avicenna," Averroes spells 
it out in detail and adds critiques directed at the literalists, who would have all people 
read scripture literally, and the Mutakallimun, dialectical theologians, who would 
have all people reason on the basis of assumptions about the nature of God and cre-
ation. For Averroes, such ways of proceeding not only have their own intrinsic prob-
lems but are deeply inappropriate because they fail to respect the abilities of the 
diverse intellectual classes and may lead to confusion on the part of simpler believers 
who are unable to understand that scripture is to be read differently by individuals 
of differing levels of insight and understanding. Some have characterized this as a 
view which highlights philosophical reflection in the context of "a plurality of ratio-
nalities,"6 while others understand Averroes to be holding that 
there is no privileged access to the nature of reality which represents how things 
really are. The ordinary person has just as valid a grasp of how things really are as 
does the philosopher or religious thinker, provided that the ordinary person is able 
to use concepts which connect with that reality in a loose way. 7 
Although Arabist scholars have almost universally denied that Averroes' own teachings 
entail a doctrine of Double Truth, understood in this way Averroes might be held to have 
taught in fact what in the Latin West came to be called the doctrine of Double Truth.s 
The present essay explores Averroes' understanding of God and in doing so 
employs a different methodological approach, one more traditional than the two cited 
above, one founded on Averroes' foundational statement in the Fa# al-Maqdl on the 
nature of truth. There, in the religious context of that legal determination of "whether 
the study of philosophy and logic is allowed by the [Religious] Law, or prohibited, or 
commanded-either by way of recommendation or as obligatory,,,g Averroes writes, 
Now since this religion is true and summons to the study which leads to knowledge 
of the Truth, we the Muslim community know definitively that demonstrative 
study does not lead to [conclusions] conflicting with what Scripture [or Religious 
Law] has given us; for truth does not oppose truth but accords with it and bears 
witness to it. 10 
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As I have shown elsewhere,l1 this remark that "truth does not oppose truth but accords 
with it and bears witness to it" is a paraphrasing quotation of Aristotle's Prior Analyt-
ics 1.32, 47a8-9; "For everything that is true must in every respect agree with itself." 12 
In accord with this statement by Averroes, in the present article I assume that religion 
and philosophy are able to intersect and that propositions asserted about God, human 
beings, and the world are open to the possibility of contradicting one another in such a 
way that one is false and the other true. Averroes recognizes both this intersection and 
the methodological priority of philosophy when in his Fa~l al-Maqdl he asserts that 
scriptural interpretation which is in conflict with demonstrated truth must be set aside 
as incorrect and the text in question must be interpreted allegorically.ll If that is the 
case for Averroes, it may well be that purportedly "true" statements in religion about 
God and purportedly "true" statements in philosophy about God should be ranked 
and compared with reference to their full truth since "truth does not oppose truth but 
accords with it and bears witness to it." Certainly this is in agreement with his view 
expressed in the Fa~l al-Maqdl where he argues that it is known that demonstrative 
philosophical arguments do not conflict with Scripture or Religious Law. And if that 
is so, it may be quite appropriate to consider in the thought of Averroes whether pur-
portedly central principles and foundational pillars of religion concerning the nature 
of God are in fact compatible with truths about the deity grounded in philosophical 
argumentation. 
In presenting Averroes' philosophical understanding of God I am making two 
assumptions. The first is the one to which I refer just above, namely the falsity of the 
notion that there are two truths, one for philosophy and one for religion. My second 
assumption is that truth in its fullest for Averroes is to be found in his philosophical 
writings. This is founded on his statement in the Tahdfut at-Tahdfut (Incoherence of the 
Incoherence) where he explains that the accounts and discussions in that work are 
dialectical in nature and that for a full account one must turn to his technical demon-
strative works written for students of demonstration. I understand this to mean that 
the truth in the fullest sense is to be found in his philosophical works and particularly 
in his Aristotelian commentaries where he asserts there to be demonstrations. 14 
All this is the theory of the philosophers on this problem and in the way we have 
stated it here with its proofs, it is a persuasive not a demonstrative statement. It is 
for you to inquire about these questions in the places where they are treated in the 
books of demonstration, if you are one of the people of perfect eudaemonia, and 
if you are one of those who learn the arts, the function of which is proof. For the 
demonstrative arts are very much like the practical; for just as a man who is not a 
craftsman cannot perform the function of craftsmanship, in the same way it is not 
possible for him who has not learned the arts of demonstration to perform the 
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function of demonstration which is demonstration itself: indeed this is still more 
necessary for this art than for any other-and this is not generally acknowledged 
in the case of this practice only because it is a mere act-and therefore such a 
demonstration can proceed only from one who has learned the art. The kinds of 
statements, however, are many, some demonstrative, others not, and since non-
demonstrative statements can be adduced without knowledge of the art, it was 
thought that this might also be the case with demonstrative statements; but this is 
a great error. And therefore in the spheres of the demonstrative arts, no other state-
ment is possible but a technical statement which only the student of this art can 
bring, just as is the case with the art of geometry. Nothing therefore of what we 
have said in this book is a technical demonstrative proof; they are all non-technical 
statements, some of them having greater persuasion than others, and it is in this 
spirit that what we have written here must be understood.!S 
And, following Aristotle closely in his Long Commentary on the Posterior Analyties, 
Averroes asserts that a demonstration is a syllogism proceeding on true premises 
to produce knowledge and which is such that the very grasp of the syllogism is that 
knowledge. In his Long Commentary on the Posterior Analyties Averroes stresses that, 
without true premises known to be such and the other conditions of the premises 
required by demonstration, the syllogism will not be a demonstration.16 He says that 
such an argument will be a dialectical syllogism, a rhetorical syllogism or a sign!7 and 
will not be al-yaqin alladhi fi al-ghayahl secundum maximam veritatem. 18 I understand 
this to be in accord with my first assumption. 
AVERROES ON GOD 
While Avicenna proceeds to indicate the existence of God or the Necessary Being on 
the basis of the mind's grasp of the notion that all reality is divided into the possible 
and the necessary,!~ Averroes follows Aristotle in beginning his philosophical account 
from the physical world and its need for an ultimate cause of motion. For Averroes it 
is the science of physics, which includes cosmology, that establishes the ground of the 
eternal motion of the heavens. Aristotle's requirement of eternal motion which as 
necessary cannot be otherwise led him to assert the existence of a plurality of unmoved 
movers with one among them understood to be first. Working within a conceptual 
framework affected by the mixture of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic thinking together 
with religious thought on the nature of God, Averroes followed and expanded on Aris-
totle. For Averroes the celestial bodies have an indestructible matter free of contraries 
and contain potency only for movement. Herbert Davidson explains this by saying, 
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The heavens must instead be construed as a body of a completely different type. 
consisting in the association of a simple matter-like substratum in motion, and an 
independently existing immaterial form moving the substratum. The matter-like 
substratum exists necessarily by virtue of itself, and the form is a source of infinite 
power whereby the substratum moves eternally.20 
The form to which Davidson refers is the immaterial and incorporeal soul which is 
associated with the celestial body. This soul has in turn a separate intellect as its extrin-
sic final cause. In his Aristotelian philosophical context, Averroes continues to hold 
that the immaterial intellects as such are not efficient causes of the motion in the celes-
tial bodies. This, however, is as far as the science of physics can proceed in this inves-
tigation since physics has as its subject matter bodies and their accidents of motion. 
Physics is concerned with what has in itself its own principle of motion and rest 
(Physics 2.2, 192b14) and hence cannot then have as its subject matter incorporeal and 
immaterial substances which are not subject to motion and rest. 
Aristotle, in Metaphysics 6.1, argues that unless the existence of immaterial entities 
is established, first philosophy will be physics. But Aristotle and Averroes do consider 
that they have shown the necessity of the existence of immaterial entities and so pro-
ceed to consider what we call metaphysics to be first philosophy. Now, while Aristotle 
quickly moved in Metaphysics Lambda to assert that the plurality of unmoved movers 
must each be immaterial and consequently intellectual, Averroes is apparently aware 
of the necessity of another step in this account. For Averroes, psychology, a branch of 
physics which bridges to metaphysics, must playa role here.2! 
In both his Long Commentary on the De Anima and in his Long Commentary on the 
Metaphysics, Averroes asserts the necessity of the use of the science of psychology to 
make possible the understanding of the natures of the immaterial entities to which 
physics ultimately points.22 What are the essential elements in his arguments for this 
position? First, it must be assumed that human beings do have knowledge, that is, an 
actuality somehow in them for classifying particulars in groups, something we call a 
grasp of the universal. Such an actuality existing as a power in human beings is for 
Averroes and Aristotle an immaterial actuality. Second, Averroes understands (a) that 
the universal nature of this requires that it not be such as to take place in an individual 
entity, since, as particularized by the individual in which it exists, it would not be an 
intelligible in act, that is, an understood universal, and also (b) that discourse and 
interpersonal communication on intellectual issues would not be possible unless there 
is a single shared science or a thesaurus21 of forms in which all human beings share or 
to which all refer in thought and discourse. On the basis of this, then, Averroes asserts 
that there must be a separate Material Intellect and a separate Agent Intellect actualizing 
it, shared by all human beings, and that these separate intellects, although immaterial 
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entities, nevertheless must be considered as part of human nature by way of an opera-
tionallinking rather than as ontological parts of human beings,24 
Additionally entailed in this understanding are four conclusions relevant for con-
sideration of Averroes' understanding of God which can be drawn from this discussion. 
First, in this demonstrative account there is no basis for asserting personal immor-
tality for individual human beings, that is, there is no provision in his metaphysical 
account of human beings and their relationship to the separate Material Intellect and 
Agent Intellect for individual human beings to have any existence after earthly life.2s 
In the penultimate discussion of the Tllhafutl1t-Tilhafut, Averroes does provide argu-
ments for the continued personal existence of the soul after death by way of a trans-
migration of individual souls to celestial matter. But such a view contradicts basic 
Aristotelian principles of psychology to which Averroes adheres and is clearly only a 
dialectical argument the conclusion of which is not known to be necessary or true. 
That is to say, Averroes in the dialectical context of the Tahafot at-Tahafot does not take 
that argument for personal immortality seriously but rather merely sets it forth for 
those who wish to find some grounds for believing in personal immortality.2G 
Second, for Averroes only the human species is argued to be eternal and that argu-
ment is asserted on the basis of the eternality of the separate intellects. The separate 
intellects as immaterial and therefore incorruptible are understood to have no begin-
ning and no end to their existence. While the existence of the Material Intellect is 
asserted by Averroes on the basis of human knowledge understood as indicated 
above, once it is established as separate and eternal. its existence as such is used to 
argue that its eternal nature as recipient of intelligibles in act also entails the eternality 
of the human species. This works as follows. The senses affected by sensible objects 
provide the imaginative powers of the soul with images which, while always essentially 
particular, are then refined with as much particularity removed as possible. The results 
are denuded intentions (which are nevertheless still particular intentions) then pre-
sented to the Agent Intellect for transformation by its "light" into universal intentions 
now constituting knowledge. In that process these are impressed upon the separate 
Material Intellect which is the thesaurus which all human beings share in the unity of 
science. 
Third, this establishment of the existence of the separate Material Intellect and 
Agent Intellect as immaterial entities, which are intellectual in nature, proves that 
immateriality and intellectuality coincide. This is something Averroes could have 
argued from the general Aristotelian account of the relationship of form and being, 
since for Aristotle substantial form and substantial being as investigated in Book Zeta 
of the Metaphysics are shown to coincide and to be mutually entailed in any actually 
existing entity.27 This entails that all that has form has intelligibility, that is, is an intel-
ligible object. On this basis it could be further argued speculatively that any actually 
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existing separate form must, as existing in act, be an intelligible not in potency but in 
act and that it must be so in virtue of itself, that is, its essence. Hence, any actually 
existing separate form must be both intelligible and intelligent in virtue of itself. This 
is what Aristotle asserts in Book Lambda of the Metaphysics. 28 For Averroes it is psy-
chological theory which provides the evidence for such a position. In this way Averroes 
is able to assert that psychology is essential to the explication of the nature of meta-
physics and its assertion of immaterial unmoved movers as intellectual entities. 
Fourth, on his understanding of the Material Intellect as an intellectual substance 
into which are deposited forms derived from sense perception and purified by the light 
of the Agent Intellect, Averroes establishes that it is possible for there to be some sort 
of potency in separate immaterial intellectual entities. This is a doctrine which he cites 
in his Long Commentary on the De Anima: 
... as sensible being is divided into form and matter, intelligible being must be di-
vided into things similar to these two, namely into something similar to form and 
into something similar to matter. This is [something] necessarily present in every 
separate intelligence which thinks something else. And if not, then there would 
be no multiplicity [410] in separate forms. And it was already explained in First Phi-
losophy that there is no form absolutely free of potency except the First Form29 
which understands nothing outside Itself. Its being is Its quiddity (essentia eius est 
quiditas eius). Other forms, however, are in some way different in quiddity and 
being.30 If it were not for this genus of beings which we have come to know in the 
science of the soul, we could not understand multiplicity in separate things, to 
the extent that, unless we know here the nature of the intellect, we cannot know 
that the separate moving powers ought to be intellects.n 
These conclusions, which he understands as demonstrative, allow Averroes to 
assert that among the plurality of separate immaterial unmoved movers established by 
physics, there can be understood to exist a hierarchy of intellectual entities having less 
or more potency in them. At the pinnacle of the hierarchy is the first of these entities, 
God or the First Cause and First Form, who has no need in any way of anything outside 
Himself and is in complete actuality without potency in any sense. All the other intel-
lects in the hierarchy, however, while being substances per se eternal and incapable of 
destruction, nevertheless are understood by Averroes to have some potency in them 
and to be classified in the hierarchy according to their intellectual powers. There are 
two considerations to be noted here. The note of potency found in all but the First, for 
Averroes, seems to be tied to the fact that in all below the First there is contained a 
reference to something outside themselves, namely a reference to the perfect and com-
pletely actual First Cause. That is to say, the separate intellects other than the First are 
not absolutely simple and have some sort of composite-albeit still intellectual and 
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immaterial-nature as a consequence of their need to think something outside them-
selves. They are "composite things [which] surpass one another by the lack of compo-
sition and their proximity to the simple and the first in this genus."'2 Averroes uses this 
to explain that in comparison with the First they are of a lower ontological status and 
that their intellectual powers are proportional to their "proximity" to the First. But for 
my purposes here I will focus on the nature of this First, known as God. 
Averroes follows Aristotle in asserting that the First Principle or God is self-
thinking thought, a conclusion which is also suitable in regard to all other immaterial 
intellects in the hierarchy. But God's case is unique in that He does not have within His 
nature any comparison to anything outside Himself. All other entities have a relation 
to God while God has no relation or comparison to other entities. But does this mean 
that God has no knowledge of anything outside of Himself, no knowledge of particu-
lars or, for that matter, of universals? If such is the case, of course, God would per se 
have no particular providence and perhaps also no universal providence, at least in the 
meaning which those words have in a religious understanding which entails divine 
intention in regard to creatures for their benefit. 
In his Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, Averroes asserts that God has knowl-
edge which is properly understood as neither of particulars nor of universals. He writes, 
The truth is that because il knows only ilself, il knuws the existents thruugh the 
existence which is the cause of their existences .... [T]he First ... is He who knows 
absolutely the nature of being qua being, which is His essence. Therefore, the word 
"knowledge" is said of His knowledge and our knowledge by homonymy. For His 
knowledge is the cause of being and being is the cause of our knowledge; and 
His knowledge cannot be described as universal, nor as particular, for he whose 
knowledge is universal knows potentially the particulars which are in actuality and 
the object of his knowledge is of necessity knowledge in potentiality since the uni-
versal (knowledge) is only knowledge of particular things; if the universal (knowl-
edge) is knowledge in potentiality and there is no potentiality in His knowledge, 
then His knowledge is not universal. A clearer (argument) is that His knowledge is 
not particular, because the particulars are infinite and no knowledge encompasses 
them; He is not characterized by the knowledge which is in us, nor by the ignorance 
which is its opposite, just as that which is not fit to possess any of these two (knowl-
edge and ignorance) is not characterized by the knowledge which is in us, nor by 
the ignorance which is in us, and whose existence is not distinct from his knowl-
edge has thus become evident.ll 
In this context it is worth recalling that the attribution of knowledge to God in the first 
place is a consequence of the assertion that immaterial entities are necessarily intellec-
tual entities, something I have shown is based on Averroes' arguments in psychology. 
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As an intellectual entity which cannot be merely in potency but must necessarily exist 
as an actuality of activity. God must then be exercising in romplete actuality, eternally, 
an intellectual activity. Since intellectual activity is knowing, God is eternally active in 
knowing with the object of His knowing being Himself. Hence, it is clear that God's 
activity should be characterized as knowing on the basis of the view that any immate-
rial activity must be an intellectual activity of knowing. But, as Averroes himself indi-
cates in the quotation just cited, the predicate "knowing" when said of God does not 
have the ronceptual content which it does in the two forms of knowing of which we 
have experience. That is to say, we do not know the predicate to assert anything more 
than that God has an immaterial activity which should be intellectual and thereby 
should be classified as knowledge, since every intellectual activity is suitably called 
knowledge. The predicate asserted of God is true, but we do not have sufficient under-
standing of the conceptual content of the predicate so as to apply it with any more 
meaning than "God has an immaterial activity which should be intellectual and 
thereby should be classified as knowing." 
Critical consideration also has to be given to his assertion that God "knows the 
existents through the existence which is the cause of their existences .... [T]he First ... 
is He who knows absolutely the nature of being qua being, which is His essence."34 
If we can talk about God's knowledge in any meaningful sense, something which is 
highly questionable on this account, we have to say that God's knowledge of His 
essence does not necessarily involve his knowledge of what is per accidens consequent 
upon His essence.35 When he writes, "The truth is that because it knows only itself, 
it knows the existents through the existence which is the cause of their existences," 
Averroes is stressing not that God knows the world and its many parts or even that 
God knows anything outside himself. Rather, God, who is final cause for the universe 
and all its beings, knows only Himself, as Averroes repeatedly stresses in the Long Com-
mentary on the Metaphysics. When Averroes asserts that God "knows the existents" this 
must not be taken literally but must be understood in conjunction with the rest of the 
sentence, "through the existence which is the cause of their existences." For Averroes 
the predicate "Creator" is said of God not because of a divine activity of creation ex 
nihilo by some form of efficient creative causality, something rejected by Averroes on 
philosophical grounds, but because of a relation of final causality on the part of the 
world relative to God.36 But, while it makes sense in Averroes' account to hold that 
final cause and formal cause coincide in the being of God, God's role as final cause of 
the universe does not entail that He know the forms of things in the universe in any 
direct way or even in any indirect way. That would perhaps be possible if God were the 
efficient cause of those things and if this efficient causality in the emanative creation of 
things-something completely unknown in the thought of Aristotle-were properly 
established to be understood along the lines of Aristotle's account of the causing of 
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motion in Physics III17 where he asserts that the actuality of the agent as cause (the 
mover) is in the patient (the moved) and traceable to the agent which possessed 
actually what the patient possesses only potentially prior to the action.38 Indeed, that 
might open the door to a doctrine of naming of God as cause through a doctrine of 
analogy asserting that the effect is revelatory of its cause. In knowing Himself God 
could perhaps be argued to know what emanates from Him or what is created by Him. 
But such cannot be the case for Averroes since his philosophical account of God 
identifies God only as final cause for other things. 19 For a doctrine of analogy to func-
tion here, the actuality of the agent would have to come about in the patient, some-
thing which occurs only in efficient causality. God does not pre-contain the forms of 
the world for Averroes. Rather, the beings of the world are drawn to God as final cause 
of all and so God's role as extrinsic final cause draws them toward the perfection pos-
sible for them in virtue of the forms already present in them. God does not create the 
forms of the world but rather only draws them toward their perfection.40 
Thus, God does not know the world since His activity is fully and totally self-
contained. What is more, it makes no sense to say that by His self-knowledge God has 
either universal or particular intention in relation to the world if intention requires 
knowledge. Does this mean that God has no providence in relation to the world? On this 
notion Averroes holds that all that exists below the celestial bodies is receptive of the 
providence of the celestial bodies responsible for guiding the world.41 He then writes, 
It must be known to you that this is Aristotle's view concerning providence, and 
that the problems arising about providence are solved by (his view); for there are 
people who say that there is nothing for which God does not care, because they 
claim that the Sage must not leave anything without providence and must not do 
evil, and that all his actions are just. Other people refuted this theory through 
the fact that many things happen that are evil, and the Sage should not produce 
them; so these people went to the opposite extreme and said that therefore there 
is no providence at all. The truth in this is that providence exists, and that what 
happens contrary to providence is due to the necessity of matter, not to the short-
comings of the creatorY 
God's providence in reference to the world means nothing more than what is conse-
quent upon His nature as most perfect being toward which all reality strives by final 
causality. God has no relation to and no knowledge of the world, but the world is 
related to God on the principles which Averroes employs in his demonstrative 
accounts. This does not mean that there is no providence in any sense, but only that 
providence in behalf of the changing world below the sphere of the moon is consti-
tuted in the effects of the celestial bodies and movements on the world. They have no 
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intention in relation to the world; rather, their intention is in relation to their final 
causes. Providence, when said of the activity of the celestial bodies and their motions, 
means the reception of beneficial influence from a higher cause to the extent that this 
influence is not hindered "due to the necessity of matter." In this account providence 
and intentional action are fully distinct. If the concept of providence necessarily 
entails intentional action, God is not in fact providential. However, Averroes can assert 
that the predicate "providential" can be said of God insofar as the effects of God's final 
causality provide benefit to the world by drawing the world and all its beings toward 
the perfection of God, the most perfect being in the universe. This is all that his 
demonstrative account of Divine "providence" will allow. If others understand "prov-
idence" to entail other meanings on the basis of the religious views which they bring 
to their consideration of the notion, that is because of their philosophically unfounded 
assumptions based on religious beliefs. 
Averroes' discussion of religion in the Tahafut at-Tahafut seems to proceed in 
accord with this. There he explains that in the case of human beings who, like all the 
rest of the universe, are related to God, God's final causality involves religious activity 
on the part of human beings for whom 
the religions are, according to the philosophers, obligatory, since they lead toward 
wisdom in a way universal to all human beings, for philosophy only leads a certain 
number of intelligent people to the knowledge of happiness, and they therefore have 
to learn wisdom, whereas religions seek the instruction of the masses generally.43 
The value of religion, then, is to be found in the intrinsic fulfillment to which it leads 
all human beings, namely, happiness. This is why 
all the learned hold about religions the opinion that the principles of the actions 
and regulations prescribed in every religion are received from the prophets and 
lawgivers, who regard those necessary principles as praiseworthy which most incite 
the masses to the performance of virtuous acts.44 
These two quotations taken from his Tahafut at-Tahafut emphasize the importance of 
religious duties and activities as contributing to human perfection and the attainment 
of happiness, the human version of the perfection which each entity seeks in its striving 
in final causality toward the perfection of God. These dialectically argued views are in 
accord with those found in his demonstrative accounts of these matters as just discussed. 
Averroes' philosophical account of God follows upon Aristotelian principles and 
reaches a conclusion fundamentally the same as that of Aristotle. This can be dis-
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cerned if one takes his methodological suggestions seriously and looks to the demon-
strative arguments of his commentaries on Aristotle for the philosophical account. 
This entails setting aside the literal understanding of the rhetorical and dialectical 
accounts of religions when truth is sought in its fullest sense, al-yaqin alladhi fi 
al-ghdyahlsecundum maximam veritatem. Those religious accounts are not without 
value since they serve the practical function of leading human beings to the moral 
virtue which is necessary for human happiness and which is necessary for the per-
fection of the intellectual virtues by which human happiness in its fullest can be 
attained.4C, The fullness of moral virtue requires the involvement of the community 
and so too intellectual virtue in its fullness also requires the support of the community 
insofar as moral excellence is presupposed by intellectual excellence. In this sense reli-
gion, in supplying for the community "necessary principles as praiseworthy which 
most incite the masses to the performance of virtuous acts ... " makes intellectual 
fulfillment possible. In this sense the principles of religion can be regarded as "true" 
insofar as they contribute to the welfare and happiness of human beings, something 
quite in accord with Aristotle who holds that practical truth involves "truth [which] 
is in agreement with right desire."46 In accord with this, the religious proposition 
asserting God's providential interest and involvement can be regarded as "true" in the 
sense of being practically valuable in guiding human beings toward moral virtue, while 
it is in fact not proven true since the demonstrative philosophical account has no pro-
vision for providential action of an intentional nature by God in relation to the world. 
Taken literally the religious proposition may be false and certainly is insufficiently 
grounded in demonstrative philosophical argumentation for its truth to be asserted. 
But, of course, the consequences are stronger than that. The common religious propo-
sition which asserts God to have an interest in the world and to have a providential 
relation to the world is in fact false for Averroes because demonstrative argument 
about God's nature and providence shows that God knows only Himself. While the 
world is related to God in a relation of dependence, the philosophical account holds 
that God is not related to the world and has no intentionality in relation to the world 
with the consequence that providence cannot be predicated of God as al-yaqin alladhi 
fi al-ghdyahlsecundum maximam veritatem. For Averroes, then, this would be a situation 
in which a religious proposition is in contradiction with a demonstrated philosophical 
proposition.47 Thus, just as he holds that there cannot be correct interpretation of 
Scripture which is in contradiction to demonstrated philosophical propositions,48 
so too religious propositions derivative on Scripture or generally accepted religious 
belief cannot be true if they are in contradiction with demonstrated philosophical 
propositions. 
The philosopher Averroes' support of religious statements in Scripture and Reli-
gious Law which affirm such common doctrines as universal and individual providence 
may in some sense be an acknowledgment of a plurality of rational ways to approach 
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reality but surely is not an instance of a genuine support for a theory of double truth. 
Averroes' views on the priority of demonstrative argumentation in the interpretation 
of Scriptural statements makes it clear that religion and philosophy are intersecting 
disciplines and that propositions common to both can be evaluated with a view to 
their truth. And when there are conflicting propositions, the principle which comes 
into play is, "Truth does not oppose truth but accords with it and bears witness to it." 
What is more, the one best in the position of evaluating truth is the philosopher whose 
concern is with the truth of propositions which are characterized as al·yaqin alladhifi 
al·ghdyahlsecundum maximam veritatem. 
Nevertheless in the Tahdfut at-Tahdfut he asserts that" ... the religions are, accord-
ing to the philosophers, obligatory, since they lead towards wisdom in a way universal 
to all human beings, for philosophy only leads a certain number of intelligent people 
to the knowledge of happiness, and they therefore have to learn wisdom, whereas 
religions seek the instruction of the masses generally."4!' To this he later adds that 
philosophers are not to express doubt about religious principles or to contradict the 
sayings of prophets when he writes, 
For it belongs to the necessary excellence of a man of learning that he should not 
despise the doctrines in which he has been brought up, and that he should explain 
them in the fairest way, and that he should understand that the aim of these doc-
trines lies in their universal character, not in their particularity, and that, if he ex-
presses a doubt concerning the religious principles in which he has been brought 
up, or explains them in a way contradictory to the prophets and turns away from 
their path, he merits more than anyone else that the term unbeliever should be 
applied to him, and he is liable to the penalty for unbelief in the religion in which 
he has been brought Up.50 
What, then, is the best way to understand Averroes' assertions about the intersection 
of religious propositions and philosophically demonstrative propositions? 
As already indicated, Averroes wrote a paraphrasing Commentary on the Republic of 
Plato. Unlike middle commentaries, however, this work is not merely a paraphrase but 
rather a thoroughly Aristotelian interpretive work deeply imbued with his study of 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. 51 It is in the Commentary on the Republic that Averroes 
recounts Plato's famous "noble lie" (Republic 414B-C). This "noble lie" is put forward 
to forestall any dissension among the different classes and to unifY the community for 
its own benefit. Averroes also adds, 
And it is due to his care [for the city 1 that the prophet announced that the ruin of 
this city will only come to pass when its chief who guards it is of iron or bronze. 
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This story will be transmitted to them through music from youth, just as other 
stories are transmitted to them. When he finished this he said that the settlements 
of these chief~ and guardians of the city ought to be raised above the city and that if 
there is one of them who does not wish to accept the Law he will be smitten. 52 
In light of this, of the texts from the Tahdfut at-Tahafut, and of his remarks in the Fa~l 
al-Maqal, it appears most reasonable not to give up the principle of truth ("Truth does 
not oppose truth but accords with it and bears witness to it") nor to assert that reli-
gious propositions are without practical value, nor to embrace Double Truth, but 
rather to hold that Averroes, like Plato, understands the practical necessity and value 
of the "noble lie" for the attainment of the human end which is, following Aristotle, the 
attainment of intellectual virtue and excellence founded on moral virtue. 53 
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visible substance. 7. That the First is 'knowing' is to be understood in the same way. For it is, in 
order to know, in no need of an essence other than its own, through the knowledge of which it 
would acquire excellence, nor is it, in order to be knowable, in need of another essence which 
would know it, but its substance suffices for it to be knowing and to be known. Its knowledge of 
its essence is nothing else than its substance. Thus the fact that it knows and that it is knowable 
and that it is knowledge refers to one essence and one substance." Trans. Richard Walzer in AI-
Farabi on the Perfect State, 70-n 
29. This "First Form" is God for Averroes. 
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30. For Averroes God is pure actuality.ja·inna·hu ji'lun ma~dun, Tafsir rna ba'd al·!abi'ah, 
Book Lim C.37: 1599.7; Genequand trans. 151. Note, however, that the Latin translation appar-
ently omits this phrase. See Latin 12.37, 8: f319v G-II. 
31. LCDA 3.5, 409-410. My translation. 
32. [modify Genequand's rendering of qillah at·tarqib, "the insignificance of the compo-
sition." Tafi'ir md ba'd al-!abf'ah, Book Lim c. 51,1704.16; Genequand tr. 196; Latin, 12.51, 8: f. 
336v l. Averroes' discussion here (Book Lam c. 51,1703-7; Genequand tr. 195-97; Latin, 12.51,8: 
f. 336rE-vK) is drawn on by thinkers of the Latin West for the hierarchy of immaterial intellects 
up to God. 
33. Taftir rna ba'd al·tabi'ah, Book Urn c. 36, 1707-8; Genequand trans. 197-98; Latin, 12.36, 
8: 337A-C. At LCDA 3,36, SOl, Averroes cites Themistius in this regard: "In this way, therefore, 
human beings, as Themistius says, are made like unto God in that he is all beings in a way and 
one who knows these in a way, for beings are nothing but his knowledge and the cause of beings 
is nothing but his knowledge. (1) How marvelous is that order and how mysterious is that mode 
of being!" In his paraphrase Themistius writes, "That is why it also most resembles a god; for 
god is indeed in one respect [identical with] the actual things that exist, but in another their sup-
plier (khoregos). The intellect is far more valuable insofar as it creates than insofar as it is acted 
on; that is because the productive first principle is always more valuable than the matter [on 
which it acts]. Also, as [ have often said, the intellect and the object of thought are identical (just 
as are actual knowledge and the very object of knowledge)." Greek (1899),99.23-28; Arabic 
(1973),180.6-10; English tr. (1996),124-25. 
34. Kogan, drawing heavily on the Tahafot at-Tahafot, works hard to make sense of Averroes' 
statements that God does know the world and creates the world by his knowledge but ultimately 
finds Averroes' account sorely lacking. Averroes "bases his account of Divine causation on an 
inadmissibly ambiguous use of the verb 'to know.'" Averroes and tbe Metaphysics of Causation, 
264. Druart remarks regarding Averroes' account of Divine understanding of the world through 
understanding Himself that "this seems to be a clever but rather unsatisfactory answer to the 
problems raised by God's Knowledge of anything outside himself. Even if God is a metaphysi-
cian, and therefore metaphysics is the divine way of knowing, it still does not ensure true knowl-
edge of things here below." Therese-Anne Druart, "Averroes on God's Knowledge of Being Qua 
Being," in Studies in Thomistic Theology, ed. Paul Lockey (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 
1995),175-205. An inferior printed version of this is found in Anaquel de Estudios Arabes 4 (1993): 
39-57. My references are to the 1995 version. For the present quotation, see 198. Both Kogan and 
Druart are correct on this point. 
35. Cf. Harry A. Wolfson, "The Plurality of Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroes," 
Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 63 (1958): 233-53, 248-49. "[A]ccording to the mediaeval 
explanations there is some kind of distinction of prior and posterior in the immaterial movers 
themselves, whereas according to our explanation [of Aristotle] there is no distinction at all in 
the immaterial movers themselves; the distinction between them is only a distinction in their 
relation to things outside themselves-a distinction of external relation which, as we have 
shown, does not affect their nature. Now the assumption on the part of the mediaevals of a dis-
tinction of prior and posterior, whether that of cause or that of nobility, in the immaterial 
movers themselves has led to those endless questions as to whether that distinction does not 
after all imply a relationship of matter and form and also as to whether that relationship of 
matter and form is compatible with the initial assumption that these immovable movers are 
immaterial. But to assume, as we do, that the distinction between the immaterial movers is 
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only a distinction in their relation to things outside themselves does not lead to any of those 
questions:' 
36. Creation ex nihilo is denied by Averroes in his discussion at Taftir ma ba'd al-tabiah, 
Book Urn c.18, 1497-1505, Genequand trans.108-12; Latin, 8: 304rD-305vl. For Averroes cre-
ation consists in "bringing what is in potentiality into actuality. What becomes actual is 
destroyed in potentiality and all potentiality becomes actuality when that which is in actuality 
brings it out. If potentiality did not exist, there would be no agent at all. Therefore it is said that 
all proportions and forms exist in potentiality in prime matter." 1505; Genequand trans. 112; 
Latin 3osvH-1. 
37. Physics 3.2-3 (201b24-202b21). See particularly c. 3 where Aristotle asserts that the 
actuality of the agent takes place in the patient. 
38. Ibid., 3.3, (202b9-1O). 
39. Cf. the lengthy account of Divine causality by Kogan in his chapter on "Divine Causa-
tion and the Doctrine of Eternal Creation" in Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation, 203-65. 
40. I want to thank my friend Prof. Therese-Anne Druart for a stimulating and valuable 
critical comment on this issue following my presentation of a related paper at the University of 
Chicago Islamic Philosophy Conference held April 27-28, 2001. 
41. "He means: the actions of the celestial bodies in their sharing one with another in the 
maintenance of the world are like the actions of the freemen in the maintenance of the house; for 
just as the freemen are not allowed to perform all the actions which they desire, all their actions 
being due to the help which they give to one another, the same holds for celestial bodies. As for 
the existents which are below them, their condition is like that of the slaves and the animals 
which guard the houses: just as the actions of the slaves which share in (those of) the freemen 
are few, and even more so those of the animals, so is the case with that which is below the celes-
tial bodies with regard to the celestial bodies." Taftir ma ba'd al-tabi'ah, Book Urn c. 52, 1714; 
Genequand trans. 200; Latin, 8: 338rB-D. 
42. Taftir ma baa al·tabiah, Book Urn c. 52, 1715; Genequand trans. 200-1; Latin, 8: 338rD-F. 
43. Averroes: Tahafot at-tahaJot, 582; Van Den Berg trans. 360. 
44. Averraes: TahaJot at·tahaJot, 584; Van Den Berg trans. 361. 
45. "As for the moral virtues, it appears from their case too that they are for the sake of the 
theoretical intelligibles." Lerner, trans. 88. "But this kind of perfection, i.e. the moral, is laid 
down [in relation to 1 theoretical perfection as a preparatory rank, without which the attainment 
of the end is impossible. Hence, this perfection is thought to be the ultimate end because of its 
proximity to the ultimate end. It appears from this, then, that the human perfections are four 
classes and that they are all for the sake of theoretical perfection." Lerner trans. 92. 
46. Nicomachean Ethics, 6.1 (1139a31), trans. W.O. Ross, revised by J.O. Urmson. 
47. For another example of this sort of thing see the article mentioned in n. 26. 
48. See n. 13. 
49. Averraes: TahaJot at-tahaJot, 582; Van Den Berg trans. 360. 
50. Averroes: TahaJot at-tahaJot, 583; Van Den Berg trans. 360. 
51. Averroes also wrote a Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. The surviving 
Hebrew translation of this work has recently been published. See Averroes' Middle Commentary 
on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics in the Hebrew Version oj Samuel Ben Judah, ed. Lawrence V. 
Berman (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1999). Also see Averroes, 
In Moralia Nicomachia Expositione in Aristotelis Opera Cum Averrois Commentariis, III (Venetiis 
Apud lunctas, 1552; reprint Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1962). Regarding Averroes' Middle 
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Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, see Jerzy B. Korolec, "Mittlerer Kommentar von Aver-
roes zur Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles," Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 31 (1992): 
61-188; and L. V. Berman, "Excerpts from the Lost Arabic Original ofIbn Rushd'sMiddle Commen-
tary on the Nicomachean Ethics," Oriens 20 (1967): 31-59, and "Ibn Rushd's Middle Commentary 
on the Nicomachean Ethics in Medieval Hebrew Literature," in Multiple Averroes, ed. J. Jolivet et al. 
(Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1978),287-321. 
52. Lerner trans. 37 (41.1-7). 
53. See n. 45. I am pleased to express my thanks to Peter Adamson, Dimitri Gutas, Wayne 
Hankey, Steven Harvey, John Jones, and James South for reading this paper and offering valu-
able suggestions, some of which are incorporated here and others which will significantly 
enhance my future work on this topic. 
